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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
,STATE OF UT'AH 
1\IARGARET REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
W. VV. CLYDE & CO., a corporation, 
and FRED GRAY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8405 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth in the .appellant's 
brief, recites many facts which we deem wholly irrele-
vant and immaterial to the issues raised by this appeal, 
and omits to mention certain facts favorable to the de-
fendants to which we believe the attention of the court 
should be directed. 'V e refer to the parties as they ap-
peared in the court below. 
The only real issue at trial w.as whether the accident 
happened as claimed by the plaintiff, or as related by 
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the defendant Gray. The facts out of which the case 
arises are as follows: 
During the summer of 1953, the defendant W. W. 
Clyde & Co. (hereinafter referred to as Clyde) h.ad a 
contract for certain road construction work west of U. S. 
Highway 91, near Beck's Hot Springs. (R. 4, 7, t:~4.) 
(Ex. 6.) In performing this work, it was necessary that 
Clyde's trucks haul dirt and fill material from the east 
side of the highway to the west side of the highway. 
(R. 145). By the ter1ns of its contract, with the State 
Road Commission, Clyde was required to provide flag-
men to protect traffic from the danger of accident pre-
sented by heavy trucks passing back and forth across 
U.S. IIighway 91. (R. 146, Ex. 6) 
Pursuant to this contractual requirement, Clyde em-
ployed the defendant Gray and one Harry Gallo to act 
as flagmen at the intersection. (R. 95-96, 112-113, 147). 
Gray was stationed on the east side of the highway and 
south of the intersection, and it was his duty to halt 
north bound traffic on Highw.ay 91 when Clyde's trucks 
were approaching or crossing the highway. (R. 102, 148). 
Gallo was stationed on the west side of the highway, 
north of the intersection, and he had the duty of halting 
south bound traffic under the same circumstances.· (R. 
113). Their employment with Clyde commenced on 
August 3, 1953 (R. 95, 101). 
During the summer of 1953, the plaintiff, who 
resided in Salt L.ake City, was employed at a real estate 
office in Bountiful. (R. 16-17). It was her practice to 
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drive back and forth between Salt l~ake and Bountiful 
and she made this trip at least twice, and some times 
four times a day, in traveling between her home and her 
office. (R. 18). She was thoroughly fan1iliar with the 
highway, and with the fact that flagmen were stationed 
there to halt traffic when trucks were crossing the high-
way. (R. 18.) 
On the morning of September 17, 1953, the plain-
tiff was involved in an accident with the flagman Gray 
(R. 20). According to the plaintiff's version of the ac-
cident, the plaintiff was proceeding in the most easterly 
lane of traffic in a northerly diree;tion, and a.s she ap-
proched the flagman's position, and even before she could 
see him, she slowed down, anticipating that she might be 
flagged (R~ 19). There was another car preceding her 
at a distance of three to four car lengths, in the same 
lane of traffic ( R. 19). She observed the flagman 
waving a red flag in a plane parallel with the road or 
his body, and she observed the car preceding her pass 
by the flagman without event. (R. 20.) She construed 
the action of the flagn1an as a signal to proceed forward, 
and she started to accelerate (R. 20). As she passed 
the flagman, he raised his flag and violently struck the 
side windovv of her automobile, at the same time utter-
ing a loud yell. (R. 20). This caused the glass to shatter, 
and the noise and excitement so confused the plaintiff, 
that she temporarily lost control of her car, during which 
interval, it crossed over the center of the highway and 
into the lane of traffic for south bound traffic. (R. 21). 
She recognized her position of peril, and swerved her 
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automobile back to the right side of the road. (R. 21). 
In so doing, she twisted her back in such fashion as to 
injure it quite severely. 
Defendant Gray's version of the accident is entirely 
different. According to his testimony, he had halted 
the cars in the easterly lane of traffic, and had stepped 
in front of them, and approximately on the line separat-
ing the two lanes of north bound traffic, and was at-
tempting to halt traffic in the number two lane, or the 
north bound lane nearest the center of the highway. (R. 
105, 106, 110). His flag was held in his right hand and 
was waved up and down in a plane between his waist and 
his head. (R. 106). His left arm was also extended up-
ward. While he was so engaged in signalling the north 
bound traffic, the plaintiff "run through my flag," and 
so close to him, that it was necessary for him to step 
back in order to avoid being struck by her car. (R. 106, 
109, 110). He was not certain whether his flag came in 
contact with her car, but if it did, it was purely accidental 
and unintentional on his part. (R. 101, 106, 109). 
He also observed that the plaintiff drove down the 
road a short distance, stopped on the right hand edge, 
and got out of her car. (R. 107, 109). The plaintiff and 
Gray agree that nothing was said by either to the other. 
(R. 77, 105, 107). Admittedly neither the plaintiff nor 
her husband ever made any complaint to Clyde (R. 79), 
and the first notice that it ever received of the claimed 
accident was when suit was filed. 
The plaintiff commenced her action in three counts. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
(R. 1-5). Her first count was based on the theory of 
assault, (R. 1-2) ; her second count was based on the 
theory of negligence on the part of the defendant Clyde 
in employing a person of known vicious propensities, 
(R. 2, 4-5) ; and the third count was based on simple 
negligence in conducting the flagging operations. (R. 
2-3). During the trial of the case, the plaintiff's at-
torney abandoned the first and second counts, and it was 
stipulated that they .might be withdrawn from the con-
sideration of the jury (R. 117). The case was submitted 
to the jury on the issue of the defendants' negligence 
(third count), and the plaintiff's contributory negligence, 
and the jury returned a verdict favorable to the defen-
dants, no cause of action, (R. 203), upon which judgment 
was duly entered. (R. 204). 
The only eye witnesses to the accident who testified 
at the trial, vvere the plaintiff and the defendant Gray. 
The plaintiff called other witnesses who testified as to 
the manner in which Gr.ay had signalled at various times 
not involved in this suit, and in rebuttal the defendants 
called witnesses to testify as to the manner in which he 
had performed his duties as a flagman during the fall 
of 1953. Essentially all that is involved, and all that the 
jury had to determine, vvas whether it believed the testi-
mony of the plaintiff, that the defendant deliberately 
struck the window of her automobile after signalling her 
to proceed forward; or whether it believed the testimony 
of the defendant Gray, that the plaintiff ran through 
his flag .at a time when he was signalling for her to halt. 
The conflict in the testimonies of the two witnesses was 
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sharp and clear. Each was a party to the action, and 
interested in its outcome. The jury observed the ap-
pearance and conduct of both of them, from which it 
determined either: 
(a) That the evidence was in equipoise, and there-
fore the plaintiff had failed to sustain her burden of 
proof of negligence on the part of the defendants; or 
(b) That the testimony of Gray was the more 
credible, and that the defendants were not guilty of any 
negligence; or 
(c) That plaintiff was negligent in attempting to 
drive through or past Gray's signal flag. 
The verdict being in favor of the defendants, they 
are entitled to have the evidence, and all reasonable in-
ferences therefrom, considered in the light most favor-
able to them. 
STATEMENT OF POINT'S 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS A CONFLICT IN THE EVIDENCE WHICH 
CREATED A QUESTION OF FACT FOR DETERMINATION 
BY THE JURY. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRE-
TION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTI:ON FO·R NEW 
TRIAL. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS A CONFLICT IN THE EVIDENCE WHICH 
CRE.A:TED A QUESTION OF FACT FOR DETERMINATION 
BY THE JURY. 
Plaintiff contends that the evidence compels a find-
ing in her favor. In other words, as a matter of law, the 
defendants were guilty of negligence which proximately 
caused the plaintiff's injuries, and the plaintiff w.as her-
self, as a matter of la1v, free of contributory negligence. 
Significantly, the plaintiff has failed to cite a single 
authority-, statute, case or text,-in support of her 
position. The lavv to the contr.ary is so well settled as 
to be axiomatic. It finds its origin in the ancient con1-
n1on law, the Constitution of this State, and an unbroken 
line of decision from this Court, extending back to ter-
ritorial days. It would be a work of superrogation, even 
to cite all of the deciBions of this court dealing with the 
question. Suffice it to s.ay, that the rule has been re-
iterated countless times, and while the rule is almost as 
old as the jury system itself, it lives today not only with 
undiminished vitality, but perhaps in unsurpassed vigor. 
The following quotations from some very recent deci-
sions of this court, suffice to illustrate: 
The language of Mr. Justice Crockett, speaking for 
the court in the case of Weenig Bros., Inc., v. Manning, 
(Ut.), 262 Pac. 2d 491, is particularly apropos to the 
facts of this case: 
"In order to upset the judgment and com-
mand one in its favor, the first obstacle plaintiff 
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must overcome is to demonstrate that the evi-
dence shows with such certainty that reasonable 
minds could not differ thereon that the defendant 
was guilty of negligence which proximately caused 
the collision. In the absence of such degree of 
proof we could not direct that such finding be 
made and reverse decision of the lower court. 
The defendant having prevailed, on conflicting 
matters the evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to him." 
In the case of Green vs. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society, ( U t.), 284 Pac. 2d 695, this court, speaking 
through Mr. Justice Worthen, stated the rule thusly: 
"This being a law action the question is not 
whether the evidence would have supported a 
judgment in favor of appellant but whether the 
judgment entered by the trial court finds support 
in the evidence. 
"The trial judge saw and heard the witne,sses 
and was in a better position than we to properly 
evaluate it and to pass on their credibility." 
Mr. Justide Wade, speaking for this court in the 
case of Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Gutherie, (Ut.), 256 Pac. 
2d 706, said : 
"It needs no citation of authority that this 
court will not redetermine facts found by the fact 
finder in the lower court in law cases if in the 
light most favorable to the respondent the evi-
dence is sufficient to sustain such findings." 
And in the recent case of Coombs v. Perry, (Ut.), 
275 Pac. 2d 580, again speaking through Justice Croc-
kett, this court said : 
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"The plaintiff having won a judgment below, 
the verdict is protected by a bulwark of rules 
firmly established in our law. First, by the gen-
eral proposition that the judgment and proceed-
ings in the lower court are presumptively correct 
with the burden upon defendant to show error. 
Second, where a trial judge has passed upon a 
question and a jury, presumably fair and im-
p.artial, has made a finding, while such is not con-
trolling, it is at least entitled to some considera-
tion and should not be wholly ignored in review-
ing the situation and attempting to see, as ob-
jectively as possible, whether reasonable n1inds 
might so conclude. Third, that the court must 
review the evidence, together with every infer-
ence fairly arising therefrom, in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, and similarly, must con-
sider any lack or failure of evidence in the same 
light, which \Ve do in reviewing the facts here." 
Reasons for the rule were further amplified in the 
case of Gittens v. Lu,ndberg, (Ut.), 284 Pac. 2d 1115, 
where this court said: 
"It is the duty of this court to leave the ques-
tion of credibility of witnesses to the jury or fact 
trier and we have quite consistently adhered to 
that policy. As has often been said, the jury is 
in a favored position to form impressions as to 
the trust to be reposed in witnesses. They have 
the advantage of fairly close personal contact; the 
opportunity to observe appearance and general 
demeanor; and the chance to feel the impact of 
personalities. All of which they may consider in 
connection with the reactions, manner of expres-
sion, and apparent frankness and candor or want 
of it in reacting to and answering questions on 
both direct and cross-examination in determin-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
ing whether, and· to what extent, witnesses are 
to be believed. ·Whereas, the appellate court is 
handicapped by being limited to a review of an 
impersonal record. 
" * * * The jury may evaluate the testimony 
of witnesses and accept those parts which they 
deem credible, even though th·ere be some incon-
sistencies. An examination of the record here 
·does not show that facts testified to would be im-
possible in the light of known physical facts, or 
so contradictory or uncertain as to justify a con-
clusion that any -of the witnesses were entirely 
'unworthy of belief' as plaintiff contends." 
The principles above stated are illustrated and re-
iterated in the following recent decisions of this court: 
Farrington v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., of Ports-
mouth, (Ut.), 232· Pac. 2d 754; Garret Freig·ht Lines v. 
Cornwall, (Ut.), 232 Pac. 2d 786; Lowder v. Holley, 
(Ut.) 233 Pac. 2d 350; American Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 
(Ut.), 235 Pac. (2d) 361; Beagley v. U. 8. Gypsum Co., 
(Ut.), 235 Pac. 2d 783; Morris v. Russell, (Ut . .), 236 Pac. 
2d 451; Toomer's Estate v. [1. P. R. Co., (Ut.), 239 Pac. 
2d 163; Seybold v. U. P.R. Co., (Ut.), 239 Pac. 2d 174; 
Pottlsen v. Manness, et al., (Ut.), 241 Pac. 2d 152; Mc-
Collum v. Clothier, (Ut.), 241 Pac. 2d 468; M. 8. T. & T. 
Co. v. Consol. Freight Ways, (Ut.), 242 Pac. 2d 563; 
Tuttle v. P. I. E. Co., (Ut..), 242 Pac. 2d 764; Gen. Ins. 
Co. of Am. v. Lewis, (Ut.), 243 Pac. 2d 433; Buckley v. 
Cox, (Ut.), 2·47 Pac. 2d 277; Great Am. Indem. Co. v. 
Ber~yessa, (Ut.), 248 Pac. 2d 367; Parkinson v. 4-mund-
son, (Ut.), 250 Pac. 2d 944; Watkins v. Ut. Poultry & 
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Farmers Coop., (Ut. ), 251 Pac. 2d 663; Stickle v. U. P. R. 
Co., (Ut.), 251 Pac. 2d 867; Seamons v. Anderson, (Ut.), 
252 Pac. 2d 208; Nichols v. Wall, (Ut.), 253 Pac. 2d 355; 
'{hirteenth & Wash. Sts. Corp v. Neslen, (Ut.), 254 Pac. 
2d 847; Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., (on rehearing), (Ut.), 
259 Pac. 2d 294; Ladder v. Western Pac. R. Co., (Ut.), 
259 Pac. 2d 588; Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., (Ut.), 261 
Pac. 2d 927; Chamberlain v. Montgomery, (Ut.), 261 Pac. 
(2d) 942; Beck v. Jeppsen, (Ut.), 262 Pac. 2d 760; Hill-
yard v. [lt. By-Products Co., (Ut.), 263 Pac. 2d 287; Roche 
v. Zee, (Ut.), 264 Pac. 2d 855; Scoffield v. Sprouse-Reit.z 
Co., (Ut)., 265 Pac. 2d 396; Wilson v. Oldroyd, (Ut.), 
267 Pac. 2d 759; Hodges v. Waite, (Ut) ., 270 Pac. 2d 
461; Jensen v. Taylor, (Ut.), 271 Pac. 2d 838; Nasser v. 
Burton, (Ut.), 272 Pac. 2d 163; Kimball Elevator Co., Inc., 
v. Elevator Supp.lies Co., Inc., (Ut.), 272 Pac. 2d 583; 
Staley v. Grant, (Ut.), 276 Pac. 2d 489; John C. Cutler 
Assoc. v. DeJay Stores Inc., (Ut.), 279 Pac. 2d ·700; 
Upton v. Heiselt Constr. Co., (Ut.), 280 Pac. 2d 97; Best 
v. Huber, (Ut.), 281 Pac. 2d 208; Rogalski v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., (Ut.), 282 Pac. 2d 304; Lawrence v. Bam-
berger R. R. Co., (Ut.), 282 P.ac. 2d 325; Jensen v. 
Mower, (Ut.), 294 Pae. 2d 683; Sprague v. Boyle Bros. 
Drilling Co., (Ut.), 294 Pac. 2d 689; Winchester v. Egan 
Farm Service, Inc., (Ut.), 288 Pac. 2d 790; Ray v. Con-
sol. Freightways, (Ut.), 289 Pac. (2d) 196; Gaddis Inv. 
Co. v. Morris on, (Ut.), 289 Pac. 2d 730; Price v. Price, 
(Ut.), 289 Pac. 2d 1044; and Malstrom v. Consolidated 
Theatres, Inc., (Ut.), 290 Pac. 2d 689. 
Perhaps no principle has been better settled, or 
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more often reiterated by this court within the past five 
years, than that ordinarily questions of the defendant's 
negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence are for 
the jury. Only where all reasonable minds must agree, 
can it be held as a matter of law, that either party is 
either free of, or guilty of, negligence, or that a verdict 
should be directed in favor of either p.arty. The principle 
is further illustrated by the following: Compton v. Ogden 
Union Ry. & Depot Co., (Ut.), 235 P.ac. 2d 515; Wright 
v. Maynard, (Ut.), 235 Pac. (2d) 916; Martin v. Steven:J, 
(Ut.), 243 Pac. 2d 747; Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., (Ut.), 
249 Pac. 2d 213; Morby v. Rogers, (Ut.), 252 Pac. (2d) 
231; Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed Co., (Ut.), 265 Pac. 2d 
1013; Bates v. Bu,rns, (Ut.), 281 Pac. 2d 209; Hewitt v. 
Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., (Ut.), 284 Pac. 2d 471; and 
Covington v. Carpenter, (Ut.), 294 Pac. 2d 788. 
In light of the above principles we proceed to a 
consideration of the contentions made by the plaintiff 
on this app·eal. 
It is not without significance that no motion for a 
directed verdict was made by the plaintiff at the trial of 
this case. The first time the plaintiff ever contended, 
or even suggested, that she was entitled to a directed 
verdict was upon her motion to set aside the verdict or 
for a new trial. On this appeal she asserts that the jury 
must h.ave found either that there was no incident at 
all, or else that the app·ellant herself was guilty of conM 
tributory negligence. The first suggestion deserves but 
brief attention. In view of the fact that both parties 
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admitted that an incident occurred, it certainly may not 
be presumed that the jurors disregarded all of the evi-
dence and their oaths of office, and made a finding 
wholly unsupported by the evidence. However the jury 
might well have found plaintiff guilty of contributory 
negligence, which finding is well supported by substan-
tial evidence. As indicated in our statement of facts, the 
verdict of the jury may be sustained on either of the 
following three theories : ( 1) The plaintiff failed to sus-
tain her burden of proving that the defendants were 
guilty of negligence; (2) the jury were convinced by the 
evidence that the accident was not caused by any neglig-
ence on the part of the defendants; ( 3) that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence. 
The plaintiff failed to offer .any evidence whatso-
ever, of negligence on the part of the defendants. Her 
testimony, if believed, would prove an assault or battery, 
but not negligence. But this theory was abandoned by 
the plaintiff during the trial. She did nothing to carry 
her burden of proof of negligence. The only evidence on 
this subject came from the defendant Gray. According 
to his testimony, he signalled the plaintiff's automobile 
to stop, by waving a red flag in an arc from the height 
of his shoulder to a point over the top of his head, at 
the same time extending his left hand upward. The jury 
could well have believed that such a signal was clear, 
unambiguous and given in a prudent and proper manner, 
free of any negligence whatsoever. 
With respect to the problem of contributory negli-
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gence, the jury might well have believed that the plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence, even though 
they believed her own te·stimoney. As she approached 
the scene of the accident, she anticipated that she might 
be flagged. When the flagman Gray came into view, he 
was standing at the edge of the road and waving his 
flag. On previous occasions when she had passed by 
this point, if the flagman did not intend to halt traffic, 
he stood away from the road with his flag down. In this 
instance, he was standing on the edge of the road and 
waving his flag. In view of past experience, this, 'in 
itself would be some indication that it was his intention 
to halt traffic. The jury might well have believed that 
under such circumstances, the. plaintiff should not have 
proceeded by the flag until certain that it was the in-
tention of the flagman that she should proceed. Of 
course, if the jury believed the testimony of the de-
fendant Gray, as they \vere entitled to do, they could 
hardly escape finding the plaintiff guilty of contributory 
negligence since according to Gray'_s testimony, she "run 
through my flag." 
It may be conceded th.at the evidence would permit 
a finding in favor of the plaintiff. That is not the issue 
here. The jury found for the defendants, and the de-
fendants are entitled to have the evidence, and every 
reasonable inference therefrom, viewed in a light most 
favorable to them~ If there is any evidence in the record, 
upon which reasonable minds could find as the jury did 
in this case, then the verdict may not be set aside by 
this court. The jury had the opportunity, as this Court 
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ance and demeanor, and manner of testifying. From 
these observations the jurors concluded that the de-
fendants were not liable. The trial judge having had 
the same opportunity for observation, refused to set 
aside the verdict. 
The position of defendants respecting Point I may 
be vvell summarized by quoting from the opinion of Mr. 
Justice Wade in the case of Horsley v. Robinson, (Ut.), 
186 Pac. 2d 592, where it was said: 
"Under a general verdict we cannot be as-
sured what facts the jury found or that they found 
the facts necessary to sustain their verdict. So 
it is universally held under the common law sys-
tem, as it must be in order to give stability to 
jury verdicts, that the appellate court 1nust sus-
tain the verdict where the evidence is sufficient 
to support a finding of the necessary facts to 
do so. Otherwise, the appellate court would be 
required to reverse every verdict where in its 
opinion the great preponderance of the evidence 
is against .a finding of the necessary facts to sup-
port it, even though the evidence is such that rea-
sonable minds might conclude from the evidence 
that such necessary facts happened. To do so 
would be to review the evidence no matter what 
we call it. The question of what were the facts 
and where is the preponderance of the evidence 
is for the jury and not for the court to determine. 
Our problem is only to determine whether there 
is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. In 
doing so our standard is: Could a reasonable mind 
be convinced by the evidence of the necessary 
facts to support the verdict 1 If so, it must be 
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sustained. 
"That this court is not authorized to review 
the facts found by the jury is expressly provided 
by our Constitution, Article 8, Section 8, where it 
is provided 'In cases at law the appeal shall be 
on questions of law alone.' Since we cannot re-
view the facts, whatever we think of where the 
preponderance of the evidence is, is immaterial. 
If we were to review the evidence and reverse 
this case because we think the preponderance of 
the evidence on a material issue is. against the 
plaintiff, we do so in violation of that constitu-
tional provision." 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRE-
TION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FO·R NEW 
TRIAL. 
Plaintiff's position under her Point II is even 
weaker than her argument under Point I. In the e:arly 
case of Newton v. Brown, 2 Ut. 126, this court laid down 
the rule of decision regarding motions for new trial, 
based on insufficiency of the evidence, which has been, 
followed ever since. '~l_lhis court there said: 
"When the motion for a new trial is founded 
upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict and judgment, a large discretion is 
vested in the court below, in refusing or granting 
the motion. It must plainly appear that this dis-
cretion has been abused before the Appellate 
Court will interfere with this action in grant-
ing th·e motion upon this ground. 
"In the case before us, the record shows that 
the testimony was, to say the least, very conflict-
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ing, and in such cases the granting or refusing of 
a new trial rests peculiarly in the discretion of the 
court. * * * 
"There w.as no abuse of discretion in this 
case, and for this reason alone the judgment of 
the court below should be affirmed." 
In the later case of White v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. 8 
U t. 56, 29 Pac. 1030, this court said: 
"One of the grounds assigned in the motion 
for new trial is that the evidence was insufficient 
to sustain the verdict. There was a manifest con-
flict in the evidence. If the plaintiff is to be be-
lieved, he w.as entitled to recover. * * * The rule 
is, when a motion is made for a new trial because 
of the insufficency of the evidence, and the testi-
mony is conflicting, the granting or refusing of 
a new trial is largely in the discretion of the trial 
court, and its act will not be overruled unless there 
is a clear abuse of discretion." 
The same principles were followed in Anderson v. 
Salt Lake & 0. Ry. Co., (Ut.), 101 Pac. 579, and Lacina v. 
Smith, (Ut.), 105 Pac. 914. 
The rule was further expostulated 1n James v. 
Robertson, 39 Ut. 414, 117 Pac. 1068, in the following 
language: 
"While the district court, in the exercise of 
a sound legal discretion, without basing his rul-
ing upon any specific error of law may, under cer-
tain circumstances, possess the authority to grant 
a new trial, yet we cannot do so, nor can we 
exercise the discretion which the district court 
might, and in some cases perhaps ought to have 
exercised. In cases like the one before us, where 
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all other assignments fail, and the only available 
assignment is ihat the evidence does not justify 
the verdict of the jury, and where the trial court 
has refused to grant a new trial, all that we 
are authorized to do is to look into the evidence 
to ascertain whether there is any substantial 
evidence in support of every material element, 
which plaintiff is required to establish in order 
to recover. If there is such evidence, then, so far 
as we are concerned, the verdict must stand, al-
though in our judgment if we passed on the 
facts, the verdict upon the whole evidence should 
have been to the contrary. Nor can we, under the 
guise of reviewing an abuse of d~iscretion by the 
trial court in refusing to grant a new trial upon 
the ground that the verdict is not supported by 
the evidence, pass upon th~e weight of the evi-
dence. What the district judge might, or even 
should have done in this regard we may not do 
for him, simply be·cause he refused to do it." 
(Italics ours.) 
It w.as further discussed in Va.liotis v. Utah-Apex 
Mining Co., 55 Ut. 151, 184 Pac. 802, as follows: 
"It is undoubtedly true, as counsel for appel-
lant contends that the trial judge may and should 
· set aside a verdict for insufficiency of the evi-
dence and grant a new trial, whenever in his judg-
men the verdict is clearly and palpably against 
the weight of the evidence. Not to do so, would 
be .an abuse of discretion. * * * 
"But the trial judge ought not as a general 
rule to disturb toh~e verdict if in his opinion there 
is substantial evidence to support it. To set aside 
the verdict in such case would be to invade the 
province of the jury, in whom is vested the power 
to decide all questions of fact and to whom all 
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evidence thereon is to be addressed." (Italics 
ours.) 
The court further said: 
"One of the obvious reasons therefor is that 
the appellate court, limited to the examination 
of the record merely, has not the advantage that 
the trial judge has to judge such matters, having, 
as he does, the witnesses before him and being 
given the opportunity to see the witnesses, hear 
their testimony; and observe their demeanor 
while testifying. * * * To which we may add that, 
by constitutional provision of this state, appeals 
do not lie on questions of fact in law cases. Whit-
taker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 Pac. 980; Har-
ris v. Laundry Co., 39 Utah, 436, 117 Pac. 700 
Ann. Cas. 1913E, 96; Hill v. S. P. Co., 23 Utah, 
94, 63 Pac. 814; Hoggan v. Cahoon, 31 Utah, 172, 
87 P.ac. 164; Nelson v. S. P. Co., 15 Utah, 325, 
49 Pac. 644; Anderson v. Mining Co., 15 Ut. 22, 
49 Pac. 126; Connor v. Raddon, 16 Utah, 418, 52 
Pac. 765. 
"The granting or denial of a motion for new 
trial founded on the insufficiency of the evidence 
to justify the verdict, where the evidence is con-
flicting, rests in the sound legal discretion of 
the trial judge, and the question directly involved 
on appeal is whether or not that discretion has 
been improperly exercised or abused. As said in 
the case of Harrison v. Sutter St. R. Co., 116 Cal. 
161, 4 7 Pac. 1020: 
" 'That the granting of a new trial is a thing 
resting so largely in the discretion of the trial 
court that its action in that regard will not be 
disturbed except upon the disclosure of a mani-
fest and unmistakable abuse has become axiomatic 
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and requires no citation of authority in its sup-
port. ' " 
The court concluded as follows : 
"This court has rep,eatedly held that the dis-
cretion of the trial court, exercised in granting 
or refusing to grant a motion for new trial, based 
on the insufficiency of t·he evidence to justify the 
verdict, cannot be interfered with when, upon 
examination o.f the evidence as disclosed by the 
record, it is apparent that there is a substantial 
conflict of evidence as to material issues of fact 
in the case relative to which the insufficiency is 
alleged.· In such a case this court must hold as 
a matter of law that no abuse of discretion is 
shown. * * * 
* * * * 
"It was a case of the credibility of witnesses, 
substantially conflicting evidence and inferences 
to be drawn therefrom concerning which fair-
minded men might reasonably entertain different 
conclusions. * * * The judgment of the trial court 
is therefore affirmed, with costs to the respon-
dent." (Italics ours.) 
To the same effect see Thompson vs. Brown Live 
Stock Co., 7 4 Ut. 1, 276 Pac. 651. 
In Brown v. Union Pac. R. Co., (Ut.), 290 Pac 769, 
this court appropriately observed: 
"The trial court, having seen and heard the 
witnesses, did not feel justified, although it had 
the power, to set aside the verdict because it was 
against the evidence. We, who have only read 
the record of the trial and proceedings, are asked 
to say that the jury and the trial judge did not 
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do their duty. This we are unwilling to do. The 
appellant had a fair trial, and the trial court 
committed no errors." 
See also Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Ut. 347, 57 Pac. 
2d 708; Chatelain v. Thackeray, (Ut.), 100 Pac. 2d 191; 
and Bowers v. Gray, ( Ut.), 106 Pac. 2d 765. 
The authorities were extensively reviewed in Moser 
v. Z. C. M. I., (Ut.), 197 Pac. 2d 136, in a comprehensive 
opinion wherein it was said: 
"It is a matter now too well settled to admit 
of any serious dispute (and appellants do not con-
tend otherwise) that the question of granting or 
denying a motion for new trial is a matter largely 
within the discretion of the trial court. White v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 8 Ut. 56, 29 P. 1030; 
Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Ut. 606, 
161 P. 50; Utah State National Bank v. Living-
ston, 69 Ut. 284, 254 P. 781; Thompson v. Brown 
Live Stock Co., 7 4 Ut. 1, 276 P. 651; Jensen v. 
Logan City, 89 Ut. 347, 57 P. 2d 708. This. rule 
applies whether the motion is based upon insuf-
ficiency of the evidence or upon newly discovered 
evidence. See cases above cited and V ali otis v. 
Utah Apex Mining Co., 55 Ut. 151, 184 P. 802; 
Greco v. Gentile, 88 Ut. 255, 53 P. 2d 1155; and 
Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Ut. 457, 
142 P. 2d 674. This court cannot substitute its 
discretion for that of the trial court. James v. 
Robertson, 39 Ut. 414, 117 P. 1068, 2 N.C.C.A. 
782. We do not ordinarily interfere with rulings 
of the trial court in either granting or denying a 
motion for new trial, and unless abuse of, or 
failure to exercise discretion on the part of the 
trial judge is quite clearly shown, the ruling of 
the trial judge will be sustained. Lehi Irrigation 
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Co. v. Moyle, et al., 4 Ut. 327, 9 P. 867; vVhite 
v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., supra; Utah State Na-
tional Bank v. Livingston, and Trimble vs. 1Jnion 
Pacific Stages, supra. * * * 
"The rule in this jurisdiction, early laid down 
by this court, is that where a motion for new trial 
is based upon ,insufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port the verdict, the trial court will not be held 
to have abused its discretion in denying th'e mo-
tion unless there is no substantial evidence in the 
record to support the verdict. United States v. 
Brown, 6 Ut. 115, 21 P. 461; James v. Robertson, 
39 Ut. 414, 117 P. 1068, 2 N. C. C. A. 782. There-
fore, if reasonable minds could have found as 
the jury did in this case, from the evidence be-
fore it, then we cannot say that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's mo-
tion for new trial on the grounds of insufficiency 
of the evidence to support the verdict." (Italics 
ours.) 
In concluding the court said: 
"And the jury having determined this ques-
tion in plaintiff's favor, and the trial court hav-
ing denied defendants' motion for new trial, this 
court cannot say that the trial court abused its 
discretion unless there was no substantial evi-
dence to support the verdict, or in other words, 
that all reasonable minds must agree that it was 
plaintiff .and not defendant Rogers, who trans-
gressed the center line of the highway." (Italics 
ours.) 
See also Toomer's Estate v. Union Pac R. Co., (Ut), 
239 Pac. 2d 163. 
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In Uptou;n Appliance & Radio Co., Inc. v. Flint, et 
al., (Ut.), 249 Pac. 2d 826, this court said: 
"Jury trials are a part of the fundamental 
tenets of our judicial system and where, as in 
this case a litigant has fully, completely, .and with-
out restraint been permitted to show his full 
grievance to a jury and they have conscientiously 
and without any showing of prejudice or other 
extraneous influences decided the matter there 
must be some basic and compelling reason so 
inherent in the evidence that the trial judge would 
be warranted in placing his judgment as to the 
result to be reached over and above that of the 
JUry. 
" ' A court, vacating a verdict and granting 
a new trial by merely setting up his opinion or 
judgment against that of the jury, but usurps 
judicial power and prostitutes the constitutional 
trial by jury.' Jensen v. Denver & Rio Gr.ande 
Railroad Company, 44 Ut. 100, 138 P. 1185, 1192." 
In Wilson v. Oldroyd, (Ut.), 267 Pac. 2d 759, this 
court said: 
"Because of their [Jury's] advantaged posi-
tion courts are extremely reluctant to interfere 
with their verdicts. This is necessarily so in order 
that the Tight of trial by jury assured under our 
law be preserved. If the courts were prone to 
set aside jury verdicts and substitute their own 
judgments therefor, whenever they disagreed vvith 
the jury, the right would be .abrogated and the 
jury system would be but a pretense. The con-
cept of trial by jury necessarily presupposes that 
there is a wide area within which the pendulum 
of the jury's deliberations may swing without 
interference from the court. And so long as they 
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remain within the boundaries of what reasonable 
minds could believe their findings should remain 
inviolate. 
"The validity of the verdict in the instant 
case is reinforced by the fact that the trial judge 
had given his approval by refusing to vacate or 
modify it. As we stated in Geary v. Cain, ' * * * 
in case of doubt, the deliberate action of the trial 
court should prevail. Otherwise, this court will 
sooner or later find itself usurping the functions 
of both the- jury and the trial court, * * * ' " 
The principles were reaffirmed in Coombs v. Perry, 
275 Pac. 2d 580. 
We have no quarrel with the decision of this court 
in King v. U. P. Railroad Co., 221 Pac. 2d 892, cited 
in the plaintiff's brief at page 13. However, nothing 
therein contained adds anything to the position of the 
plaintiff. All that that case hold is (in conformity with 
well established precedent) that the trial judge may 
grant a new trial on grounds of insufficiency of the evi-
dence to warrant the verdict, where the evidence is con-
flicting, and where, in the judgment of the trial judge, 
the weight of the evidence is against the verdict. But 
here the trial court refused to upset the verdict. And 
under the rules enunciated in the c.ases above cited and 
discussed, such ruling may not be held to be an abuse 
of discretion. On the contrary, the evidence being in 
-conflict, as a matter of law the trial judge was not guilty 
of an abuse of discretion. We can conclude our argument 
under this point no better than by quoting the language 
of this court in its most recent expression of opinion on 
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the subject, in the case of Bowden v. D. & R. G. W. R. R. 
Co., (Ut.), 286 Pac. 2d 240, where it was said: 
"Ordinarily the trial court has a wide discre-
tion in granting or denying motions for a new 
trial, with which this court is reluctant to inter-
fere, and will do so only if there is a clear abuse 
of discretion. * * * 
* * * * 
"We reaffirm our commitment that 'The right 
of jury trial * ~ * is * * * a right so fundamental 
and sacred to the citizen * * * (that it) should be 
jealously guarded by the courts'. But once hav-
ing been granted such right .and a verdict ren-
dered, it should not be regarded lightly nor over-
turned without good and sufficient reason; nor 
should a judgment be disturbed merely because 
of error." 
CONCLUSION 
There was a conflict in the evidence, and the verdict 
of the jury is amply supported by substantial evidence 
in the record. There is no showing that the trial court 
abused his discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for 
.a new trial. The judgement should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN 
& CHRISTENSEN 
.Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
1205 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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